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Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions 
to Toleration 
David J. Lorenzo Jamestown College 
Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but 
because his prudential approach and practicaljudgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argumentfirst by outlining 
the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important 
continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings 
on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude 
by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation 
of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications. 
Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists 
from toleration when he otherwise supported 
an extensive set of religious freedoms? While 
the context of seventeenth-century England is important, 
I point to the mechanics of his discussion of toleration as 
the critical factor in the exceptions to toleration he made, 
particularly in the way prudence and practical reasoning 
connect his conclusions with traditional judgments. I ar- 
gue further that Locke's problems are still relevant to our 
assessment of contemporary pragmatic justifications of 
toleration and the separation of state and religion, and 
that our understanding of those problems should per- 
suade us to deploy textual justifications that are more 
extensive than the practical judgments those discussions 
invoke.l 
Explanations for Locke's limited toleration. Explana- 
tions for Locke's failure to embrace a universal toleration 
vary. Some analysts, such as Cranston (1991,81), Schochet 
(1992, 52), and Murphy (2001, 225), assign a determin- 
istic role to his experiences and contexts. In their view 
events like the English Civil War, the "Popish Plot," the 
papal bulls aimed at the English government, and the Re- 
vocation of the Edict of Nantes decisively established the 
threat Catholics and atheists posed to toleration, order, 
and national security. Rawls (1999a, 92) more generally 
implies that had Locke lived in different circumstances he 
would have championed full toleration. Yet we know that 
Locke developed his position before the Edict of Nantes 
was revoked in 1685, before the "Popish Plot" was man- 
ufactured in 1681, and despite his residence in Cleve, a 
city he characterized as peaceful, stable, and tolerant of 
Catholics (Locke 1993a, 184). Moreover, contemporaries 
like Henry Stubbe and William Penn advocated a much 
broader toleration. Context alone therefore cannot ex- 
plain his position. 
Other analysts point to aspects of Locke's discus- 
sion of toleration. Some emphasize his general reliance 
on conventional views, such as Sandoz's (1972) argu- 
ment that Locke's stance flowed from the English sus- 
picion of enthusiasm and disbelief. Ashcraft (1986, 498; 
1993, 203) points to the pervasive seventeenth-century 
English view of Catholics as loyal only to the pope, and 
argues that Locke used this conventional understanding 
to locate Catholics outside the "natural moral commu- 
nity." Marshall (1994,365-6) and Harris (1998,72, 123-4, 
179-82) also argue that Locke's discussion of Catholics 
was influenced by convention as well as political contexts, 
while Dowretz (1990,66,119-20) points to Locke's theism 
to account for his position on atheists. 
Others emphasize Locke's pragmatic stance. Wootton 
(1993, 109-10) refers to Locke's judgment that while 
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usually ideas are more important than actions, the ideas 
inherent in Catholicism and atheism "were pernicious" 
and therefore not to be tolerated. Kraynak (1980) argues 
that Locke opted for a limited toleration for prudence 
sake rather than from a principled commitment to free- 
dom of conscience, a stance that did not call on the mag- 
istrate to tolerate views believed to threaten the state and 
order. And Mendus (1989, 26-7) maintains that Locke's 
rationalist attack on Augustinian justifications for intol- 
erance, absent a positive defense of toleration, did not ap- 
ply to justifications that referenced social order and state 
security. 
These latter explanations illuminate several impor- 
tant points: Locke's reliance on prudential or pragmatic 
grounds, his concern with order, his failure to provide a 
positive defense of toleration, and the conventional views 
he endorsed. Yet they fail to explain fully the relationships 
among those elements, and subsequently fail to appreci- 
ate all the dangers that prudential thinking and practical 
judgments pose to toleration. In particular, while Mendus 
correctly holds that the combination of Locke's failure to 
provide a positive defense of toleration and his emphasis 
on prudence cleared the way for order-based justifica- 
tions, she passes over the crucial role tradition plays in 
that mix. In contrast, the explanation I provide empha- 
sizes the link between Locke's prudential method and the 
conventional views he endorsed. It runs like this. 
Locke employed a natural-rights paradigm, main- 
taining that in the absence of a compelling reason for 
us not enjoying a right, we hold that right if it existed in 
the State of Nature and we did not give it up when we cre- 
ated government. We need not justify such political rights; 
rather it is up to the magistrate to justify any attempt to 
remove them. In this scheme rights are the rule and their 
refusal the exception. The advantages of this approach 
are considerable, but its weakness is that nothing but the 
naturalness of the right stands between the right as a rule 
and exceptions to the rule. Given that the Lockean con- 
ception of government makes the maintenance of order 
and security a primary duty for the magistrate, there are a 
considerable number of reasons linked with that duty that 
the magistrate can advance to justify removing a right. As 
Mendus argues, without a positive justification of rights, 
justifications for removing rights tied to order and secu- 
rity frees the magistrate selectively to exclude particular 
groups from enjoying rights even if he does not expand 
his power over all groups. 
The link between prudence and tradition greatly in- 
creases the danger that the magistrate and analysts will 
follow this route. Garver (1987) argues that prudence is 
a mode of moral reasoning that falls between the conser- 
vative orderliness of algorithmic methods and the radical 
freedom of heuristics. To reason prudently means creating 
exceptions to general rules, clearing a space for practical 
judgment. When we apply this definition in the context of 
rights, we see that the judgmental freedom prudence pro- 
vides creates an exception to the general award of rights, 
allowing the magistrate to use practical judgment at the 
citizen's expense. This procedure seems to fit nicely the 
process by which a political right is denied in a Lockean 
scheme, particularly given the importance of the magis- 
trate's practical duties to protect order and security. But 
I suggest a further connection that runs through tradi- 
tion. The conservative side of prudence which Garver ar- 
gues produces stability of judgments often manifests itself 
in references to traditional texts from which derive both 
the nature of the exception to the rule and the practical 
judgment subsequently applied. Previously accepted cat- 
egories of exceptionality and conventional lines of obser- 
vation provide stability to a rule by ensuring that neither 
a particular case nor practical judgment destroys it. The 
contours of this tendency become clearer when we think 
about the nature of practical judgment and prudence. 
First, consider prudence in its generally accepted form as 
a cautious way of rendering decisions. Translated into the 
realm of rights, this understanding describes the initial 
prudential exception to the general rule granting rights 
as a rightly wary hesitation to confer those powers on 
some allegedly dangerous group of people. Traditionally 
identified dangers in turn are the most apparent. Second, 
if the practical judgment at the heart of prudence con- 
cerns itself with particulars and must lean on experience, 
as Aristotle (1962, Book VI, ch. 8, lines 10-20) holds, it 
naturally turns to traditional texts as taken for granted 
interpretations of experience. My contention therefore is 
that prudence will tend to utilize traditional texts initially 
to identify some set of groups as unfit to enjoy a right, and 
then follow through by using conventional appreciations 
of dangers to inform a practical judgment excepting per- 
manently the groups deemed particularly treacherous.2 
Prudence can make room for practical judgment with- 
out repudiating a general rule awarding rights, while si- 
multaneously and ironically penalizing the traditionally 
marginalized. 
I believe this explanation best accounts for Locke's 
stance on Catholics and atheists. I pursue this argument 
first by exploring the traditional components of Locke's 
understanding of toleration issues, and then by tracing 
the way his prudential arguments use that understanding 
to justify exceptions to toleration. 
2 Hirschmann's discussion of the "jeopardy thesis" also suggests that 
prudence begins with the attempt to protect the old and established 
and emphasizes the dangers marginal groups pose. See Hirschmann 
(1991, 86-120). 
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Locke and Tradition 
Much of the literature on Locke depicts him as a tran- 
sitional figure who mixed tradition and innovation in 
his philosophical, political, and religious writings (Grant, 
1987; Wolterstorff, 1996; Spellman, 1997, 3). This schol- 
arship, along with the initial observation that Locke ex- 
cluded Catholics and atheists from toleration, suggests 
significant qualifications are in order to Coffey's (2000, 
55) and Schochet's (1992, 148) characterizations of the 
Letter Concerning Toleration as a radical document. Cof- 
fey maintains that Locke's rejection of the Augustinian 
justification of the political control of religion and his con- 
ception of the state are decisive and revolutionary. But this 
characterization describes Locke's relationship to only a 
portion of the relevant conventional views addressing the 
magistrate's power over religion. Despite some admittedly 
important divergences, there are important specific con- 
tinuities between Locke and traditional English analysts 
regarding the groups who may or should be denied tol- 
eration and the reasons why the magistrate may regulate 
religious affairs. We find that English traditionalists, as 
with Locke, identified Catholics and atheists as unworthy 
of toleration because their views on posthumous punish- 
ment made them unreliable (Hull 1602; Elizabeth I 1602; 
Digges 1643; Charles, Earl of Derby 1669). And English 
pamphleteers referred to a range of arguments justifying 
governmental regulation of religion that include numer- 
ous references to the problems of order and security that 
Locke also emphasized. 
Since Coffey stresses the radical character of the Letter 
and the difference between the early conservative Locke 
and the later radical Locke,3 I draw out these continu- 
ities by comparing the Locke of the Letter to traditional 
views and to the earlier Tracts on Government and Essay 
on Toleration with regard to these two subjects. 
Those Excluded from Toleration 
The early Locke was traditional in allowing the magistrate 
absolute discretion in matters of toleration and religion, 
arguing that no religious matter allows the individual to 
escape the magistrate's just authority. The laws of con- 
science, he argued in the Second Tract, are subordinate 
to the laws of the magistrate in the universal legal hier- 
archy. In a blanket allusion to dissenters, he dismissed 
all those who rejected the magistrate's religious laws, ar- 
guing that their objections were the products of their 
"weak minds" or anarchistic commitments to an inner 
3Coffey (2000, 37); see also Dunn (1982, 28n), Harris (1998, pas- 
sim), and Kelley (1991, 126-7). 
light (Locke 1993c, 174). In a letter dated in 1659, two 
years previous to the date assigned the First Tract, he ex- 
plicitly mentioned the difficulties of tolerating Catholics, 
noting that their religious beliefs obligate them to obey 
a "master" other than the magistrate, one whose inter- 
ests are "backed with an opinion of infallibility and ho- 
liness" (Locke 1993f, 138). In the Essay he backed away 
from his general condemnation of dissenters and instead 
concentrated on atheists and Catholics. He insisted that 
disbelief should not be tolerated, since belief in God is 
not a "speculative opinion" but rather the "foundation 
of all morality" and the factor that differentiates humans 
from "the most dangerous sort of wild beasts." He treated 
Catholics at greater length, identifying them with sev- 
eral positions disqualifying them from toleration: their 
loyalty to the pope, their failure to embrace toleration, 
and their civic unreliability (Locke 1993d, 188, 202-3). 
But at bottom he embraced a single traditional criterion 
connecting Catholics and atheists (as well as antinomian 
Protestants) in the Tracts and Essay: the refusal to link the 
consequences of one's actions to an objective posthumous 
judgment, a refusal generated by the atheist's unbelief and 
by the Catholic's belief in the pope's power to suspend or 
enforce God's judgment at will. 
Locke identifies the same people as problematic in 
the Letter.4 While he generally grants Protestant dissenters 
toleration, he disqualified anyone who disavowed a belief 
in God and an afterlife, arguing that such a disavowal "dis- 
solves" all moral ties between the individual and society. 
He also denied toleration to those who, by their member- 
ship in a particular church, "ipso facto deliver themselves 
up to the protection and service of a foreign prince," the 
fidelity to whom is guaranteed "on pain of eternal fire." 
This reference is complicated, for while his illustration 
of someone who should not to be tolerated by reason of 
his allegiance to a foreign prince was a "Mohammetan" 
(Locke 1993e, 426),5 he had previously used this language 
to refer to Catholics. He similarly disqualified those whose 
beliefs "are contrary to human society" or the moral rules 
that are necessary to civil society, as well as those who did 
not embrace toleration, those who taught that princes 
could be removed for their differences in religion, and 
those who taught that "faith is not to be kept with heretics." 
This is language he had previously used to identify the 
practical faults of Catholics that flow from their blind 
obedience to the Pope, though it may also encompass 
4See Cranston (1991, 84), Harris (1998, 189), and Gough (1991, 
60). 
5While Matar ( 1999, 14-22) emphasizes the extent of the toleration 
Locke was prepared to extend Muslims, the Letter makes a connec- 
tion between Muslims and an external political danger that is not 
made for Protestant nonconformists in general. 
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TABLE 1 Locke and Traditional Justifications of the Magistrate's Power Over 
Religion 
Traditional Views Locke 
Types of Arguments 
Justifying Magisterial Power 1600-1670 1670-1690 Tracts Essay Letter 
Protect Protestantism/Religion 17 (11%) 15 (24%) / 
Interests of Regime 84 (54%) 21 (33%) 
Protect Laws 0 5 
Protect from Foreign Powers 4 4 // / 
Protect Order 40 5 / / 
Promote Loyalty 21 3 
Protect Monarchy 10 0 
Protect State 9 4 / 
Interests of Populace 26 (17%) 26 (43%) 
Freedom 0 10/ V/ 
Property 4 2 / 
Against Arbitrary Government 6 11 
General Interests 16 3 
Origins 30 (19%) 0 
Power from God 14 0 V 
Power Natural to Government 16 0 
Total Arguments 157 62 6 3 5 
radical Protestant dissenters who follow the inspiration 
of an inner light (Locke, 1993e, 424-6; 1993d, 138).6 
Despite the generality of its language, the Letter 
clearly identifies atheists and Catholics as groups unde- 
serving of toleration, and does so on the same traditional 
grounds as the Tracts and Essay-their attitude toward 
posthumous judgment. As Schochet argues, toleration for 
Protestants alone seems to have satisfied Locke.7 
Arguments Justifying the Power of the 
Magistrate over Religious Affairs 
As demonstrated by the sample of arguments summa- 
rized in Table 1,8 Locke's justifications of the magistrate's 
power over religious affairs in both his earlier and later 
work overlapped significantly with traditional justifica- 
tions. In traditional justifications, the Tracts, the Essay, 
and the Letter, threats to social order and state security 
6Also see Marshall (1994, 53, 365). 
7See Schochet (1992,164). Cranston (1991) and Gough (1991, 74) 
differ from Schochet on whether the post-revolution toleration acts 
satisfied Locke. 
8The pre-1670 arguments draw from 48 sources friendly to the 
Stuarts, while the 1670-1690 arguments draw from 26 sources that 
either anticipated, or justified, the Glorious Revolution. All sources 
are located in the Huntington Library. 
play a significant role. In turn Catholics and atheists as 
people who refuse to acknowledge an objective relation- 
ship between their actions and posthumous judgment are 
portrayed as threats to social order and state security, for 
in this shared view, backed by references to the Gunpow- 
der Plot and the Civil War, that refusal allows people to 
escape the noncoercive bonds the magistrate generally 
uses to keep order and safeguard security and forces the 
magistrate to exercise his coercive powers over them. 
Locke is at his most eclectic in the Tracts, provid- 
ing several justifications for the magistrate's regulation 
of religion. In the First Tract he supplied the traditional 
Augustinian argument, asserting that we need "outward 
fences to secure the more substantial parts of religion." He 
also referred to order, arguing that we require regulation to 
restrain people from "destroy[ing] all that are not of their 
profession." Indulgence for those of "tender conscience" 
paved the way for the Civil War. Finally he referenced 
state security, arguing that religious claims often served 
as a "cloak" for rebellion and sedition (Locke 1993b, 143- 
5). The Second Tract provided additional justifications. 
Locke explicitly permitted the magistrate to regulate re- 
ligious affairs and promulgate laws regarding all matters 
"indifferent," including those pertaining to worship and 
ceremony. "[H]ow close," he observed, "the affinity and 
association is between all indifferent things, whether they 
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concern religious ceremonies or secular customs" (Locke 
1993c, 176). He again argued that religious freedom allows 
passion and zeal to create discord and sedition and refer- 
enced the need to secure "dignity, decency and order." He 
made a variation of the Augustinian argument, holding 
that the magistrate may regulate religion to preserve "well- 
loved national customs" that allow people more easily to 
embrace the faith. But more generally he argued that God 
has given the magistrate power over all religious affairs 
because that power is essential to the authority needed to 
preserve humankind (Locke 1993c, 153, 155-7). 
Locke reverted to a reduced set of justifications in the 
Essay by concentrating on order and security. He argued 
variously that the magistrate may regulate religious opin- 
ions when they "tend to the disturbance of the state," "tend 
to destabilize the government," or even "cause greater in- 
convenience than advantages to the community." He also 
asserted the duty of the magistrate to move against people 
who hold opinions "destructive of human society." Signif- 
icantly he summed up by asserting that prudence should 
guide the magistrate on all matters "indifferent" (Locke 
1993d, 191-3, 197, 201). 
The Letter, like the Essay, concentrated mostly on 
justifications related to order and the security of the state, 
while adding intolerance (itself a category Protestants tra- 
ditionally used to disqualify Catholics) and threats to for- 
merly monastic property. In general it held the magistrate 
need not tolerate actions in the religious realm that are 
unlawful in the secular. Since Locke's example was infan- 
ticide, the implication is that such actions are related to 
order in general. More particularly he repeated his asser- 
tion from the Essay that the magistrate has a duty to forbid 
"opinions contrary to human society." For reasons of na- 
tional security he also gave the magistrate authority over 
people who follow foreign religious leaders. Finally he in- 
voked the need to safeguard social and political order in 
general by giving the magistrate the power to rid the state 
of people who, lacking a belief in God, cannot be trusted 
to hold to promises, oaths, and covenants (Locke 1993e, 
414-6). Thus while Locke rejected his earlier contention 
that the magistrate's duty to preserve humankind gives 
him full power over all affairs, he continued selectively to 
use that duty to justify significant amounts of religious 
regulation by alluding to the perceived threats particular 
religious views pose to the state and society. 
Referring to the chart above, we also see that despite 
his abandonment of Augustinian justifications, Locke's 
position on this subject remained traditional in impor- 
tant respects, as his remaining justifications overlapped 
with several important traditional arguments. The Letter 
invoked five of the 13 traditional justifications found in 
the sample, accounting for 37% of the total traditional ar- 
guments. Indeed, several points suggest that Locke was in 
closer company with the supporters of the Stuart regime 
in his justification of state regulation of religious matters 
for purposes of order and security than to many support- 
ers of the religious establishment set up by the Glorious 
Revolution.9 Like Locke, 39 of 48 supporters of regulation 
who published before 1670 cited problems of order, while 
26 cited security. Considerably fewer writers referred to 
these arguments in the post-1670s sample (five of 26 for 
order, six of 26 for security). 
Locke's linkages of Catholics to disloyalty and athe- 
ists to disorder were also traditional. Thirteen of the 21 
arguments in the pre-1670s sample that referenced loy- 
alty tied the problem to Catholics, as did six of the nine 
that cited threats to the state, and the five that referenced 
threats from foreign governments. Likewise in arguments 
leading up to and immediately following the Glorious 
Revolution, three of four writers who cited threats from 
foreign powers, the three who cited problems of loyalty, 
and the four who cited the need to protect the state linked 
these problems with Catholicism. Typical of all these ar- 
guments is John Gordon's early warning to James I that 
"So as you that no sooner subject your selfe unto 
their [the Popes'] lawes, but upon the first dislike, 
they will absolve and free your subjects from their 
oath of obedience due unto their true and lawfull 
King, they will depose you at their pleasures, and 
give your crownes to whom they like..." (Gordon 
1603, 46-7) 
Locke's linkage of disorder with atheists was equally 
traditional, reflecting more closely the arguments sup- 
porters of the Stuart establishment utilized than those the 
backers of the Revolution deployed. None of the five au- 
thors in the sample taken from the period between 1670 
and 1690 who cited order referred to the problem of athe- 
ism. They instead referred to problems of Protestant dis- 
senters. However, 14 of the 39 from the earlier sample did. 
Locke's argument was eerily similar to those of one Daniel 
Scargill in 1669, who disavowed his adherence to atheism 
on the grounds that 
"all persons so principled [as Hobbists and athe- 
ists] ought to be held by all mankinde as the most 
dangerous and declared enemies of the common 
faith amongst men. That they are not to be trusted 
upon any obligation of their faith, or pretensions 
9Murphy (2001, 11-2, 151-2, 211, 217) argues that conventional 
anti-tolerationist arguments invoked security and order, but does 
not link this observation to Locke's use of those arguments. 
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to piety, loyalty, or common honesty.... but, that 
by those principles, destructive to all society and 
commerce amongst men, they may and do de- 
lude and defeat all Oaths and Protestations, all 
faith given to God or man." (Scargill 1669, 5-6) 
Thus Locke retained customary, marginalizing de- 
scriptions and evaluations of Catholics and atheists, 
and adopted the traditional solution-governmental 
control-to the "problems" they posed precisely because 
he adopted parts of the traditional texts that painted those 
people as dangerous. Note also that the traditional prob- 
lems he identified with the presence of Catholics and athe- 
ists are mostly connected with the magistrate's duty to 
preserve mankind, a duty that Locke asserts is central to 
the state's function (Kelly 1991, 131-3). 
Principles and Prudence 
If Locke retained important traditional views regarding 
the magistrate's role in religious affairs, how did those 
views find their way into his discussion of religious free- 
dom? As I outlined above, I believe it was through pruden- 
tial limitations on toleration rights that were unopposed 
by any positive defense. For Locke, prudence qualifies, or 
makes exceptions to, the imputation of rights by high- 
lighting the importance of particular, traditional distinc- 
tions.10 
To understand how his views on this subject were 
informed by distinctions and exceptions, we turn first to 
the limitations on moral generalizations he recognized. 
limitations on Locke's Generalizations 
Locke repeatedly referred to morality as a subject we can 
"know" with certainty (Locke 1959, Book III, Ch. XI; 
Book IV, Chs. III and XII). By understanding morality in 
mixed modes (that is, by understanding the abstract rela- 
tionships among ideas, both simple and complex), Locke 
argued we derive universally applicable rules that tran- 
scend contextual limitations in our exercise of morality. 
However, he also highlighted the difficulties and obsta- 
cles we face in formulating and following moral gener- 
alizations. First he pointed to our inability to represent 
moral ideas outside our minds in ways that are precisely 
true to their mental contours and that are capable of ex- 
act replication over time. Second, he discussed the com- 
plexity of moral ideas, in that they are found in bundles. 
l?For different views of the interplay between generalizations and 
distinctions in Locke's discussion, see Ashcraft (1993, 207) and 
Coffey (2000, 56-7, 186). 
This characteristic brings "inconveniences" in the form 
of our inability mentally to replicate moral ideas exactly 
over time, and in the difficulties of holding in our mind 
all relationships such that we may with confidence make 
significant comparisons among ideas. Finally he argued 
that we have a weakness for power, wealth, public ap- 
plause, and self-esteem that keeps many of us in a kind of 
"Egyptian bondage."1 
In addition to problems with attaining a complete 
understanding of moral principles, Grant (1987, 202-3) 
points to the necessary and limiting role experience played 
in Locke's moral framework. She notes that Locke was 
careful to argue that experience must inform the applica- 
tion of a "true" outcome of a mixed mode of reasoning. 
In her view, Locke believed that rationality as a faculty 
exercised to its fullest must apprehend not only logical 
relationships, but also the character of the world, individ- 
uals' relationships with one another, and their relationship 
with God, otherwise God created humans imperfectly by 
endowing them with a superfluous capacity of observa- 
tion. We know by experience that the application of a 
rule is correct by the pain or pleasure it brings, just as we 
know that a rule is correct in the abstract by our discern- 
ment of logical relationships among ideas. Locke, Grant 
argues, saw the universe as seamlessly rational, not only 
because knowledge of simple modes reinforces that of 
mixed modes, but also because moral rules in practical 
settings requires both types of knowledge. 
If this is the case, then it appears that operational 
principles must include the uncertainty that Locke argued 
characterizes the experiential mode of knowing, an un- 
certainty that qualifies those principles (Grant 1987,204). 
In the Essay on Human Understanding (Book IV, Ch. XX) 
Locke emphasized the problems of creating operational 
principles and outlined a variety of ways in which we may 
be mistaken in our understanding of them. His discussion 
of "Wrong Assent, or Error" described the epistemologi- 
cal problems one encounters when following principles, 
including doubts concerning their validity, the role of tra- 
dition and authority, and contamination by "passions and 
inclinations." As in his earlier discussion of the problems 
of adhering to man's laws and public opinion (Book II, Ch. 
XXVIII), he argued that all principles should be subject 
to continuous experiential analysis. 
Locke therefore seems to have held that even when 
we discover a general principle of scientific morality and 
"Locke (1959, Book IV, Ch. III, 209-12). On the Reasonableness of 
Christianity (Section 243, 176-81 is similarly ambivalent regarding 
our ability rationally to apprehend a scientific morality. For con- 
trasting views on Locke's belief in the attainability of a science of 
ethics, see Fraser's discussion in Locke (1959), and Grant (1987, 
23-6). 
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unite it with experience, the resulting synthetic general- 
ization must be continually subjected to the test of experi- 
ence. To operate in the world in a way that allows humans 
to fulfill their duty to justify rationally their every judg- 
ment, "operational principles" sometimes lose the char- 
acter of generalizations. Our acceptance and application 
of a principle must be justified by (or is open to criticism 
by) experiential judgments. The only rationally defensible 
generalizations under this procedure are those limited by 
the stuff that informs experiential judgments: contexts. 
Principles may apply differently in different contexts or 
be inapplicable in some cases. Contexts can create distinc- 
tions limiting the reach of principles and generalizations, 
thereby creating exceptions to them. While the limitations 
he recognized in the Essay on Human Understanding have 
to do with our ability rationally to apprehend the correct 
set of principles, Locke's discussion of toleration identi- 
fied another important limitation, one that is connected 
with experience: prudence. 
Prudence and Rights 
As the product of a generalization limiting the power of 
the magistrate, toleration is a political right for Locke.12 
We must therefore understand Locke's conception of 
rights to understand the connection between prudence 
and toleration in his scheme. 
In The Second Treatise (e.g., Ch. II., paragraph 8), 
rights are defined as things that someone may lawfully 
do, in reference either to Natural Law or to human law. 
These powers in turn are limited by the general rule that 
we should preserve others and ourselves. Under Natural 
Law in the State of Nature we all enjoy a complete freedom 
from subjection and exercise all rights. Under human law, 
duly-authorized magistrates exercise the rights we give up 
to government, while the rights of ordinary citizens are 
set by the limits on the powers of the magistrate that flow 
from the terms of our consent, Natural Law, and the tasks 
of government. These rights of citizens are political rights, 
and may be defined as the circumstances of our natural 
existence (freedom and equality under Natural Law) that 
remain after government correctly applies Natural Law 
and properly exercises its rights.13 They exist not because 
it is necessary that we be free in order to fulfill some aspect 
of our being, or in order that we might exercise some 
crucial component of our inherent capacities, but because 
12Here I disagree with Mendus (1989, 39), Kelly (1991, 144), and 
Ashcraft (1923, 205-6) and agree with Waldron (1991, 112) and 
Schochet (1992, 151). 
13Locke (1993g, Ch. IX, paragraphs 130-1), and Gough (1991, 67- 
8). 
government cannot rationally justify a policy forbidding 
us from acting on our remaining natural liberty. 
Lockean political rights therefore have two impor- 
tant characteristics. One, they are negatively rather than 
positively justified in that their substance is derived from 
powers left over after we grant government its necessary 
powers. Second political rights, like all rights, are circum- 
scribed by the duty to preserve mankind that all, including 
governments, hold. Put together these characteristics act 
as important qualifications. All political rights in practice 
are limited by government's ability to justify their contrac- 
tion or refusal by reference to contextual and experiential 
interpretations of its duty. Insofar then as the principles 
and generalizations that elucidate political rights can limit 
government's power by referencing consent and limited 
government, contexts and interpretations of experience 
formulated into practical judgments likewise can qualify 
the application of those principles and generalizations, 
usually by referencing relevant distinctions.'4 
We see the first characteristic throughout Locke's dis- 
cussion of toleration. Nowhere does he supply a general- 
ized, positive justification of toleration on the part of the 
state. Instead, by criticizing a variety of traditional justi- 
fications for the magistrate's complete control of religious 
affairs in the Letter, he provided a negative justification of 
a limited toleration.'5 While his delineation of the limits 
of government was effective in replying to people who 
justified the magistrate's power over all religious affairs 
based on God's grant of power to the magistrate, popular 
consent, or salvation, as a justificatory strategy, it did not 
and was not meant to exhaust the list of possible reasons 
why a magistrate could regulate religious affairs and deny 
toleration by referencing distinctive exceptions. 
Locke even more explicitly embraced the second 
characteristic when in the Essay he invoked prudential 
grounds to allow the magistrate to grant a selective toler- 
ation. The reasoning the magistrate uses to fulfill his duty 
to extend toleration while maintaining order and secu- 
rity, Locke argued, is prudential as well as principled, and 
prudence is linked with particulars, not universals: 
And thus far of toleration as it concerns the mag- 
istrate's duty. Having showed what he is in con- 
science bound to do, it will be not be amiss to 
consider a little what he ought to do in prudence. 
But because the duties of men are contained in 
general established rules but their prudence is 
regulated by circumstances relating to themselves 
4On this topic see Kelly (1991, 144) and Schochet (1992, 162). 
15Locke (1993e, 394-6);Mendus (1989,26-7);Waldron (1991,112- 
8); Walker (1996, 205), and Marshall (1994, 66). 
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in particular, it will be necessary in showing how 
much toleration is the magistrate's interest to 
come to particulars. (Locke 1993d, 201) 
While Locke initiated this understanding of toleration 
in the Essay, he also employed it in the Letter. Exceptions 
and distinctions importantly inform the portions of both 
the Essay and Letter that developed Locke's understanding 
of the scope of toleration and the extent of the magistrate's 
powers. In both places he carefully distinguished among 
beliefs and spheres of activity based upon an experien- 
tial understanding of their relationship to governmental 
functions. In the Essay he marked the difference between 
actions and interests that do not affect the state or others 
and those that do; the difference between things destruc- 
tive of the foundation of society and those that are not; 
and the difference between things indifferent morally, but 
which are connected with political expediency, and those 
that are not so connected (Locke 1993d, 187, 201). Sim- 
ilarly in the Letter he distinguished between the internal 
and the external, and between things generally allowed by 
the magistrate and those generally not allowed. He also 
differentiated between dissenters who are Protestant and 
tolerant and those who are not. 
These experientially informed distinctions led him in 
the Letter to argue that because religious beliefs are inter- 
nal and generally do not affect the state or the rights of oth- 
ers, the magistrate is not justified in regulating them, thus 
justifying toleration by reference to natural rights and the 
principle of limited government.16 But he also held that 
the magistrate is justified in denying anyone the right to 
toleration when religious beliefs touch on order, secu- 
rity, property, and toleration itself. Contrary therefore to 
Ashcraft's analysis, Locke did allow the magistrate to sub- 
ject toleration to the experiential test of political prudence. 
It was Locke's assertion that an analysis of the morals and 
politics of Catholics and atheists would show that those 
groups pose a danger to the order and security of a Protes- 
tant state that led him to permit the magistrate to carve 
exceptions out of the general boundary separating the 
public and private that otherwise nullified the magistrate's 
claim to power in the realm of religion. In turn, tradition 
informed the experiential distinctions he employed. 
Distinctions and Exceptions in Practice 
Locke created prudential exceptions to the rule of tolera- 
tion when he differentiated between ordinary people and 
the potentially disorderly and disloyal. Included initially 
6Locke (1993e, 394,396); also Mendus (1989,41) and Kelly (1991, 
142). 
in the latter were not only Catholics and atheists, but also 
Protestant dissenters, who, as he had held in the Tracts, 
had been disorderly and threats to the security of the state 
during the Civil War (Locke 1993b, 153). If they were to be 
tolerated more distinctions had to be deployed in order to 
keep Catholics and atheists under the magistrate's thumb. 
Locke achieved this by emphasizing the traditional links 
between the latter groups and disorder and disloyalty as 
he applied practical reasoning to the question. 
The first distinction relates to Wootton's observation 
that Locke failed to distinguish always between belief and 
action. As Wootton notes, Locke sometimes argued that 
action, not belief, should be the basis for government 
regulation. This was his main argument for assuming the 
loyalty and orderliness of ordinary Protestant Dissenters. 
Only their actions count; their theology matters little. At 
least theoretically this position applied to Catholics given 
his conclusion that a belief in transubstantiation was irrel- 
evant to the magistrate. His emphasis here was on concrete 
actions, since actions alone impact the material interests 
governments have a duty to protect. Yet he abandoned 
this position when discussing atheists' beliefs regarding 
the afterlife, and Catholics' beliefs in the pope's author- 
ity over the Papal States, excommunication, and posthu- 
mous punishment. It need not be proved that atheists 
and Catholics acted on these beliefs in the ways Locke 
assumed. As tradition held, belief itself disqualified both 
groups from toleration.17 
The second distinction involved his analysis of the al- 
leged dangers particular groups posed to the state. Locke 
based his argument for tolerating Protestant dissenters on 
an observation and a generalization. The observation was 
that actions embedded in the religious services of Protes- 
tant dissenters (preaching, the consumption of bread and 
wine) were lawful in secular settings. The generalization 
was that we should assume the orderliness of ordinary 
Protestant dissenters as a group while treating separately 
the actions of the unruly or seditious few. He concluded 
that Protestant dissenters should generally enjoy tolera- 
tion, and if sedition did raise its head in dissenters' meet- 
ings the magistrate should only punish instances of that 
activity, not dissent itself.'8 Thus Locke separated the 
particular seditious few from the bulk of the dissenting 
Protestant population as a way of incorporating the latter 
under the wing of toleration without denying the magis- 
trate the right to protect law and order. In this argument he 
presented a progressive response to those who pointed to 
'7Locke seems to have carried over his position on Catholics from 
the Essay on Toleration (1993d, 197). 
18Locke (1993e, 430). As indicated earlier, this toleration did not 
seem to extend to antinomian Protestant dissenters. 
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the "fact" that Protestant dissenters had acted seditiously 
in the past and fomented the disorders that culminated 
in the Civil War. Instead of legislating by religious cat- 
egory he extended toleration to all ordinary Protestant 
dissenters and justified punishing only those who actu- 
ally were disorderly. 
We look in vain for this argument when it comes 
to Catholics and atheists. Locke put aside his observa- 
tion that religious exercises and beliefs in themselves have 
no political ramifications and argued that no Catholic 
would be loyal and no atheist trustworthy in his oaths and 
promises. We find no generalized toleration here; instead, 
when we look beyond the code words, the traditional re- 
ligious categories of "Catholic" and "atheist" became the 
basis upon which Locke's magistrate might use his coer- 
cive power rather than the actions of those who disturb 
the peace or endanger the state. 
The final distinction involved Locke's invocation of 
human nature and factual observations. In contrast with 
his earlier position in the Tracts, he argued that while 
Protestant dissenters did have a history of disorderliness, 
their disorder stemmed from their experiences rather than 
from their dissent. To use the terminology of the Essay 
on Human Understanding, Locke gave his "assent" to the 
proposition that Protestant dissenters would remain or- 
derly if tolerated, based on the probable truth of an obser- 
vation. The observation was that disturbances were nat- 
ural reactions to the fact that dissenters were "stripped of 
the goods which they have got by their honest industry" 
and "delivered up for a prey to other men's violence and 
rapine" (Locke 1993e, 432). As Farr (1987, 51-72) would 
put it, Locke used historical evidence and anthropologi- 
cal views to reject the traditional hypothesis (Protestant 
dissenters are always disorderly) in favor of a new one 
(Protestant dissenters are disorderly only when they are 
not tolerated) because the new hypothesis shed more light 
on the social situation than did the earlier. Yet Locke de- 
parted from this intellectual course when he withheld 
his assent to the proposition that Catholics and atheists 
would remain loyal and orderly if tolerated. While Locke 
explained away the past misdemeanors of Protestant dis- 
senters he failed to excuse Catholics and atheists despite 
decades of punitive English laws. He instead privileged 
the traditional conclusions drawn from the Gunpowder 
Plot and the Civil War.19 
For Locke, then, the dangers atheists and Catholics 
posed to communities were facts of our existence that 
justified prudentially limiting the imputation of privacy 
19Locke (1993e, 409; 1959, Book II, Ch. XXVIII). Also see 
Spellman (1997, 46) and Wootton (1993, 109). For a contrary view 
see Murphy (2001, 211-7). 
and harmlessness to religious beliefs that made tolera- 
tion rationally possible. While he was aware that tradition 
distorts our reason, he thought that employing practical 
judgments would allow him to sidestep that problem, as he 
did when he considered the case of Protestant dissenters. 
But the construction of the experience he used to make 
those judgments was deeply indebted to tradition, caus- 
ing his justification of toleration to exclude Catholics and 
atheists by reason of their traditional marginalization. 
Conclusion 
I argue that the problems with Locke's position identi- 
fied here are particularly relevant to some contemporary 
approaches to the problems of toleration and the sepa- 
ration of state and religion. Those approaches emphasize 
experience and practical judgments in justifications while 
disregarding their connection with tradition. 
For example, Murphy depicts liberal toleration as a 
minimal concept that we should justify by recourse to 
pragmatic arguments. In doing so he draws upon a history 
of toleration debates to illustrate the usefulness and lim- 
itations of a Hobbesian politics of toleration. Toleration, 
he argues, came about as a result of practical reasoning, 
"painful compromises" and "hard-headed judgments," 
rather than a "progressive flourishing of a preordained 
progress." His position is summed up by his approving 
reference to Larmore's and Shklar's limited, political, and 
pragmatic conception of liberalism. In his view we best 
understand and justify toleration by reference to practical 
judgments linked to the protection of conscience rather 
than by expanding the concept to justify something more 
than the modus vivendi state.20 
Rawls (1993a, 1993b) meanwhile depicts toleration as 
the core of a contemporary liberal consensus on the desir- 
ability of multiple conceptions of the good, a consensus 
that does not depend upon controversial references to ba- 
sic moral positions. Despite their differences on the nature 
of toleration and the desirable state, this understanding 
leads Rawls to rely upon many of the same arguments as 
Murphy when he discusses religious freedom. In particu- 
lar Rawls wishes to model justification of separation and 
toleration upon the experiential, historical elements of 
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," arguing that 
such arguments alone can appeal to and are available to 
everyone. 
20Murphy (2001,283-8, especially 287); see also Yack (1996). While 
Murphy emphasizes the variety of arguments historically used to 
justify toleration, he does so to defend a sphere of public reasoning 
that would include religious arguments, not to establish the impor- 
tance of texts to political justifications of toleration and separation. 
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But as we have seen here, to privilege experience, his- 
tory, and practical reasoning in this manner is problem- 
atic, particularly in the absence of other, positive justifi- 
cations. One could argue that using primarily pragmatic 
arguments to justify toleration runs the same risk as justi- 
fying toleration solely on natural rights grounds. Without 
thicker justifications it is easy to construct a practical case 
for denying toleration. Moreover, the historical, experi- 
ential, practical, and pragmatic judgments that we would 
rely upon are often informed by traditional texts. If we 
wish to avoid drawing toleration in Murphy's terms as a 
"static" concept, I argue that we must recognize the im- 
portant, hidden role traditional texts may play in practical, 
experiential judgments, as well as the need to create pos- 
itive textual justifications of rights to counter those texts' 
tendency to drag backwards or freeze our understanding 
of toleration and separation. 
The conclusions I draw flow from those observa- 
tions. I argue that we must not consider the conceptu- 
alization and justification of toleration and separation in 
purely practical terms. Its blindness to the role texts play 
in interpreting experience has caused the pragmatic ap- 
proach historically to favor the limitation of toleration 
and to rationalize the mixture of state and religion in al- 
most equal measures to its justification of toleration and 
separation. In its place we must provide positive as well 
as practical justifications, particularly if we concede that 
prudential considerations may allow governments, under 
exceptional circumstances, to limit the freedom to act on 
religious beliefs.21 Affirmations of toleration and separa- 
tion should first ground both free expression rights and 
separation principles in arguments holding that without 
the rights to be free of government interference to wor- 
ship, and to be free of state imposed religious doctrines to 
choose our spiritual orientation, we are seriously dimin- 
ished as persons. Mill's (1869) defense of religious liberty 
is one example of such an account, though I do not believe 
we should adopt his developmental scheme. Second, justi- 
fications should establish that those rights and principles 
are crucial to all persons and are relevant in all circum- 
stances absent an immediate and particular threat to the 
rights of others. In creating such justifications we embrace 
the conclusion that purely practical justifications are not 
as useful as those mixed with positive arguments. 
Finally I argue that we should not confine ourselves 
within a liberalism conceptualized as a "philosophy of 
politics, not a philosophy of man" when we create justi- 
fications. Rather we should appeal explicitly to texts in- 
21For example, see Reynolds v. U.S., 1878; Prince v. Massachusetts, 
1944; Braunfield v. Brown, 1961. Waldron (1991, 113-4) touches 
on this problem. 
formed by a liberal anthropology, a liberal philosophy of 
history, and a liberal understanding of biography. These 
texts should root in an explicit description of human na- 
ture Locke's observations that spirituality is necessary to 
a fully human life but dangerous when mixed with state 
affairs. More, we should create historical and biographical 
texts highlighting a liberal understanding of the rewards 
of spirituality, the dangers of state involvement in spiritual 
matters, and the historical development of limited, secular 
governments. Only by employing such diverse, extended, 
and textual justifications of toleration and separation, I 
argue, will we address the dangers posed by traditional, 
practical, and marginalizing judgments.22 
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